Yemen: Thinking about Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in One of the Worst Places for Women

Women’s power has always been limited in Yemen. Yemen ranked last in the 2020 World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index, with ranks near the bottom in economic participation and opportunity (151 out of 153 countries), educational attainment (150 out of 153), health and survival (129/153), and political empowerment (151/153). This ranking has persisted in this Index, with Yemen ranked lowest in 2014 and 2017 as well.[1] The war is only shrinking the few opportunities left for women.

Education is central to how girls and women are empowered and yet opportunities for women are shrinking. Prior to the war, there were steady improvements in education.[2] These have been overturned, with over 1.8 million children (or a third of the school going population) out of school since March 2015.

There have been similar reversals for women in public life. In 2014, women represented nearly a quarter of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) representatives. Their work led to a 30% quota for women in public positions and an 18-year minimum age of marriage. These agreements have since fallen through. Women find themselves side-lined from decision making. Women constitute less than 1% of parliament and local councils in Yemen. In the 2018 Peace Talks in Stockholm, the percentage of women negotiators was 4%.

Women have been heavily impacted by the collapse of the health system. A significant proportion of the 14.1 million people who lack adequate access to healthcare in Yemen are either pregnant or lactating mothers. The maternal mortality rate in Yemen is one of the worst in the world, with 164 deaths per 100,000 live births.[3] Conflict has also seen a rise in the number of pregnancies. At least 44.3% of households have pregnant or lactating mothers compared to 23.4% prior to the conflict.[4] The rise in the number of pregnancies has been attributed to a rise in male idleness due to unemployment, increased time spent at home, and a lack of access to modern family planning methods.

Although Gender Based Violence (GBV) was pervasive prior to the war and took a myriad of forms including forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and the denial of women’s economic rights, including their right to inheritance, these have all intensified since 2015. According to OCHA, there was a 70% spike in GBV after 2015 along with increased rates of child marriage as a coping mechanism for vulnerable families. While data is scant, one may assume that COVID-19 has led to further increases in GBV. Women also face sexual harassment in public spaces, resulting in restricted mobility and barriers to accessing aid.

The war has led women to become increasingly involved in both paid and subsistence labour, particularly women who have lost their husbands or who have been displaced. This is not a new phenomenon as women have participated in household livelihood activities historically. These changing economic roles have helped to lighten women’s domestic responsibilities and reinforced their social status. On the flip side, the changes have intensified conflict between married couples, as men are displaced, unemployed, and increasingly frustrated by their inability to provide for their families.

What else is making it harder for women now?

The security situation, political factors, economic decline, and the culture, are cited as the most common and daunting reasons for the lack of progress for women. All of these lead, unfortunately, to a lack of political will. Too many humanitarian actors, from the UN to donors, state that these issues are simply unsurmountable and that the massive level of need, incalcitrant political parties, and the drive for some type of settlement make GEWE a lesser priority. This has led to scant advocacy for GEWE from the UN Special Envoy, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and various donors. Somehow, the response has made war a ‘man’s game’ and this prevents women and others from actively engaging in reconciliation and peace, a role they have played throughout Yemen’s history.

At the same time, while ‘private space’ may be more dynamic than some assume, public space is severely restricted. This limits women’s opportunities to engage in civic activism. Throughout the history of Yemeni women’s activism, there is persistent violence, especially domestic violence. Intimate partner abuse has been identified as “one of the most widespread human rights abuses and public health problems in the world today.”[7] Given these threats, Yemen is a hostile environment for organised political action on women’s issues. Yet, ensuring that women are participants in civic activities can create the space for women to advocate for different, non gender-related issues that may then provide a foundation for future GEWE activism. They are there but they need to be seen.

What do humanitarians get wrong about women in Yemen?

Yemeni women are not homogenous and so the issue should not be treated as a monolith. They include civil society leaders, political party members, affiliates of armed groups, as well as independent technocrats.[5] They include women living in urban settings and those in rural settings where tribal customs create very different conditions for women. Many women do not see themselves as politically active or advocates on behalf of other women, even when their actions exemplify these. Many belong to groups or organisations that pursue women-oriented goals, even if they are not called that. They are there but they need to be seen.[6]

Patriarchal gender norms, such as conservative views that reject women in leadership and political positions, are complicated. These are poorly understood by many who do not consider how gender dynamics affect women’s power in the home, in the education of children, in healthcare, in the community, and how that power changes over the course of a woman’s life.

Other cultural constraints are fluid, especially during war, and can equally represent opportunities, if understood well. This is not meant to veer toward apologetic cultural relativism but to instead point out that the diversity and nuances of local contexts are especially important when considering how to promote GEWE. Unfortunately, most actors wrap themselves in a blanket of cultural relativism, as if this was enough to explain why so little could be done.

Because there are so many people in dire need, the international community has tended toward massive relief activities to keep people alive. This makes more nuanced and complicated activities, like GEWE, secondary, at best. In turn, most actors, including the largest UN actors, have very little to show in relation to actual GEWE results. The problem is that the history of humanitarian action is rife with examples of how responses save lives but also curse people with long-term extreme vulnerability. We have a responsibility to recognize that GEWE is both a rights-based issue and an effectiveness issue. Putting it aside because of the paramount goal of saving lives is simply lazy. [8]

What do humanitarians need to do to empower women in Yemen?

Best practices dictate that humanitarian action is conducted in ways that alleviate extreme vulnerabilities while creating space for women to recover and re-establish their lives within their communities and societies. This is the principle that underlies the triple nexus.[9] As stated in the One Humanity Report, “The international community has an obligation to respect and further strengthen this capacity and local leadership in crises and not to put in place parallel structures that may undermine it.”[10]

In the short-term, actors must recognise and promote the fact that empowerment is available to everyone.  The issue is that many people do not know that they have opportunities to speak-up, to challenge the status-quo, to fruitfully engage in their society in new ways. This is why it is essential that such ‘space’ is created (by consistently seeking meaningful representation) and that good examples and stories of such representation are shared widely. When people see that their cousins, nephews, aunts, and neighbours have changed their behaviours in ways that promote GEWE, it is likely that others will follow. This fundamental ‘grass roots’ approach to GEWE is what will work in Yemen. It matches the trajectory in the country, it’s history, and what civil society and women’s rights advocates across Yemen say will work.

There is a need to prioritise GEWE in ways that do not entail broad ‘gender’ based programming but that instead put women and girls at the centre of all programming. We need to ensure that they are reached and represented. We need to strive to create space where they can share their voice and gain a deeper understanding of their rights and opportunities and thus stand up and lead as possible. They need to be seen and heard in whatever ways are possible, at least as a first step.

Economic opportunity as a means of empowerment is a growing opportunity but one that could be missed if not promoted. Many women have unexpectedly found themselves responsible for their families. In response, women are working in industries from small textiles to healthcare and education. These need to be emphasised and supported so that women are not forced back to the household when hostilities end.[11]

Need to shift humanitarian actors away from strict compliance and ‘ready-made’ projects and towards working with communities to develop programmes that can be adapted to new opportunities and that create space for women to take the lead.

There needs to be a much more localised approach to programme design, implementation, and performance monitoring and reporting. There must be a proactive and persistent approach to creating opportunities for women to raise the issues that affect their wellbeing and the well-being of their families and communities. These should be included as part of all vulnerability assessments, performance monitoring, and results reporting.

Need to actively seek out, engage, and promote CSOs and women’s groups. All humanitarian actors should understand and promote how different actors network and build coalitions. This includes tracking multiple communication channels, including social media, to understand where and how voices for GEWE emerge and what might be done to provide more space for these. Humanitarian actors may consider a programme that focuses on their identification and that provides training and other services that strengthen their positions in the society, especially in lieu of their participation in the peace talks or other high-level governmental fora.

Support for any woman inclusive activity should include training in negotiation skills, leadership, public communication, and other skills that may empower women to become involved in conflict resolution and peace building.

There are ample examples of how programming has led to meaningful engagement and empowerment. Need to pay attention to the ways in which women share information, be it through community committees, in their roles as technocrats, or simply in how they share stories and engage with social media. These need to be collected, amplified, celebrated, and shared.

Support to livelihood activities that actively engage women should be prioritised. Self-help Groups, Village Savings and Loans Associations, and other activities that enable women to pool resources, expertise, and knowledge are a proven modality for both livelihood support and women’s empowerment.[12]

In policy dialogues—as they emerge and become more promising—include gender-based budgeting that ensures resources for women’s education, healthcare, and employment opportunities alongside legal rights issues. This is complicated by government policy and national law, Shari’a law, tribal customs, and other ways in which different parts of the population are governed. While these may seem somewhat premature, the groundwork for this should be done now.

Women need a central role in the peace process.

As the Yemen war enters its seventh year, peace talks are stalled despite current hopes for a ceasefire and a return to political talks. Even if they do, women and most CSOs are unlikely to be included. The UN, including the UN Special Envoy, has worked towards supporting a formal or direct role to women or CSOs in the two-party talks. This includes institutional support to the Yemeni Women’s Pact for Peace and Security, or Tawafuq, established in 2015 by UN Women. The ‘Women’s Pact’ is meant to provide a forum for women and women’s groups to “organise, debate, find common ground and leverage their collective voices to call for women’s continued engagement in public decision-making.”[13]

While these efforts falter along with the peace process, opportunities to engage women and women’s groups should not be ignored. UN Women recently published an extensive report on the role of women in peacebuilding in Yemen that is rife with examples of women’s leadership and the issues and constraints associated with this in the peace process.[14] These include:

·       The Peace Track Initiative (PTI), founded by Rasha Jarhum, a South Yemeni women’s rights and peace advocate.

·       The Women Solidarity Network of women inside and outside Yemen, from both South and North Yemen aimed at bringing women together to support and protect each other, and at uniting efforts to advocate for women’s rights.

·       The National Agenda on Women, Peace, and Security in Yemen that mobilised 76 Yemeni women leaders inside and outside Yemen that developed a draft of the National Agenda for Women, Peace, and Security was developed and that led to a second version validated with over 1,000 local leaders.

·       The Association of Mothers of Abductees and Detainees to track male political detainees that has departments for research and public relations to campaign for the release of men.

In fact, Yemen has a solid civil society history. CSOs were legally recognised in 2001 and this ushered in many activists, like the Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakkol Karman, founder of Women Journalists Without Chains. That decade also saw the first female minister appointed, along with increasing roles for women in business. The war led to a massive retreat of such organisations as they suffered attacks and violence and while this makes the approach to such organisations sensitive, they remain.

There are also historical examples, like Queen 'Arwa Bint Ahmad Al-Sulayhiyya (1048–1138) who was first a co-ruler of her two husbands and then as sole ruler from 1067 until her death in 1138. Queen ‘Arwa and her mother-in-law Queen Asma bint Shihab were the only female monarchs in the region to have had the khutba (Friday prayer sermon) proclaimed in their name in the mosques – the ultimate recognition of Muslim monarchical status.[15] More recent examples include women in southern Yemen who played a role in their country’s fight for liberation from British colonial rule in the 1960s. A recent report states: “A woman who was active with the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) recalled that, in 1963, when the revolution started, there were girls, women, men of Aden, all of us.”[16]

While the constraints on women’s participation and representation in the peace process are profound, the key lies in the active representation of local leaders and civil society organisations who can play a role. This is, of course, not without ample precedents and many have called for this.[17]  The challenge is in identifying such actors.

[1] “Global Gender Gap Report 2020.” World Economic Forum; 2019. Available here.

[2] Between 1997 and 2014, the proportion of girls aged 6 and above without formal education declined from 67% to 43%

[3] https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1040531

[4] Gressmann, W. (2016). From The Ground Up: Gender and Conflict Analysis In Yemen. Oxfam. Retrieved from: http://www.carenederland.org/content/uploads/2016/11/Yemen-gender-conflict- analysis-201016-en.pdf

[5] For an interesting report that asses the skills of Yemeni professional women, see: Nadia Al-Sakkaf, “Explaining the Lack of Progress in Yemeni Women’s Empowerment; Are Women Leaders the Problem?”  Journal of International Women's Studies; Volume 21, Issue 6; August 2020.

[6] This point is made in a report on how gender equality can be strengthened in fragile country contexts. See: Charlotte Goemans, Diana Koester and Seve Loudon; “Gender Equality and Fragility.” OECD; July 2021.

[7] Maria Holt, “The Worst Place on Earth to be a Woman: Violence against Yemeni Women in Peace and War.” Gender and Women’s Studies; 3(1):2, 2020.

[8] This occurs most often when populations are displaced and then become reliant on aid because they no longer have the social, economic, and political links that provided them some protection in the first place. There are numerous examples of this.

[9] For a comprehensive review of the triple nexus in protracted crises, see: “The Triple Nexus in Practice: Toward a New Way of Working in Protracted and Repeated Crises.” The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University; December 2019.

[10] UN General Assembly, One Humanity, Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit, A/70/709 (February 2, 2016), para. 111.

[11] For a recent study on this, see: Adnan Abdulrahman Naef Farhan, Ruba Mohammed, Adeeba Zulail, & Kholoud Shaker: “Economic Empowerment of Businesswomen in Fragile and Conflict Affected States: A Case Study of Yemen.” Social Science Dialogue; Vol. 1, Iss.1, Jan-June, 2021.

[12] The link between GEWE and economic empowerment are well known. For a summary, please see: “Pursuing Women’s Economic Empowerment.” IMF: 2019.

[13] Maha Awadh & Nuria Shuja’adeen; (Sawsan Al-Refaei, editor); “Women in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Yemen.” UN Women; January 2019. Page 17. Available here.

[14] IBID.

[15] Mernissi, Fatima; Mary Jo Lakeland; The Forgotten Queens of Islam. Oxford University Press: 2003.

[16] Maria Holt, “The Worst Place on Earth to be a Woman: Violence against Yemeni Women in Peace and War.” Gender and Women’s Studies; 3(1):2, 2020. Page 7.

[17] A compelling case is made by the International Crisis Group in ““The Case for More Inclusive – and More Effective – Peacemaking in Yemen.” International Crisis Group; Report #221; 18 March 2021. Available here.